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Abstract—Software defined networking (SDN) is a promising
network architecture, which decouples the control plane and
data plane of a network. However, SDN opens some security
challenges, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, spoofing attacks,
flooding attacks and so on. In this paper, we focus on flooding
attacks which consume the switch buffer and controller resource
resulting in SDN framework resource overloaded. To prevent
SDN framework from flooding attack, we present a defense
approach called PBUF (Packet forwarding based on BUFfer shar-
ing), which pools the idle switches to mitigate threat issues. This
approach consists of buffer management and packet forwarding
modules. The buffer management module gleans the statistics of
incoming packets and then analyzes these statistics to estimate
the buffer size by network calculus. Considering that a lot of
table-miss packets will be generated and stored in buffer
when the flooding attack is happening, the packet forwarding
module is designed to forward these table-miss packets to
idle switches to prevent the switch or controller to be overloaded.
These table-miss packets will be buffered in idle switches
and then sent to controller in a limited rate by generating
packet_in messages. The simulation results show that PBUF is
effective and only introduces a little overhead in SDN framework.
Index Terms—Flooding Attack; Security; Performance; SDN
I. INTRODUCTION
Software defined networking (SDN) [1] has become one of
the important network architectures for simplifying network
management and enabling innovation in communication net-
works. There are some vulnerabilities and limitations on SDN
framework on account of the principle of separating control
plane from data plane. For example, the controller can access
the entire SDN, therefore it brings a disaster if the controller
is compromised. Moreover, the OpenFlow switch (data plane)
also attracts attacks by some potential security vulnerabilities,
e.g., a limited buffer size may lead to buffer overflow and
further consume the computation resource of the controller in
a short time when the switch is attacked by a large number of
new packets[2]. All of these new packets, with all or part
of header fields are spoofed as random values, should be
processed by controller in a short time. We call these new
packets table-miss packets.
Meanwhile, some researchers have started to explore the
security threats and propose some possible defense methods in
SDNs [2] [3] [4] [5]. AVANT-GUARD [3] enables the control
plane and the SDN network to be more resilient and scalable
against control plane saturation attacks. FloodGuard [2] is
an advanced defense approach of AVANT-GUARD, which
proposes a proactive flow rule method and designs an extra
cache to reduce the amount of packet_in messages and
therefore restricts the abilities of an attacker to be successful.
Occurring packet_in messages are stored in an extra cache
and served using a limited rate to further reduce the impact of
the attack. However, it is expensive to design an extra cache
for storing table-miss packets in FloodGuard. Moreover,
the way how to set a threshold, indicating attack occurs or
ends, is not detailedly discussed in FloodGuard.
In this paper, we attempt to defense the flooding attack
which causes the switch buffer overflowed and controller
overloaded attack. Unlike FloodGuard, our proposed defense
method does not require to design an extra cache for storing
packet_in messages and is attack driven. We leverage the
idle buffer in other switches to store table-miss packets.
These table-miss packets will be served in switches at a
limited rate to reduce the controller overloaded. In addition, we
use network calculus to estimate switch buffer size and further
trigger PBUF that avoid the buffer overflow. PBUF can retard
the time of the buffer overflow happening at least 5 times,
compared with normal OpenFlow solution. The retarded time
is increased with the increasing number of switches.
To summarize, the contributions of our paper include the
following:
• We design the PBUF, an attack driven and efficient
defense approach, for SDN networks to prevent switch
buffer overflow and controller overloaded attack by us-
ing buffer management and packet forwarding modules.
buffer management module estimates the buffer size and
trigger PBUF to defense attack.
• We implement PBUF algorithm in packet forward-
ing module, which can effectively forward these
table-miss packets to idle switches without overflow.
• We implement PBUF in SDN framework and test its
defense effectiveness and performance. The evaluation
results show that PBUF can achieve an efficient and a
low overhead when the flooding attack is happening.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we will introduce the background including SDN,
network calculus, motivation and research challenges. Some
related works about SDN security will be introduced in
Section III. The design of PBUF is detailed in Section IV.
The implementation and evaluation of PBUF is introduced in
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Fig. 1. SDN Framework.
Section V. At last we discuss and conclude our work in Section
VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Vulnerabilities of SDN
SDN [6] is currently attracting significant attention from
both academia and industry. The framework of SDN is shown
in figure 1. However, SDN indeed raises some open security
challenges. Then, we summarize some security issues accord-
ing to figure 1 as follows.
• Control layer. A compromised controller can compro-
mise the whole network since a centralized controller
is the centralized decision-making entity. This drawback
attracts different attacks such as DoS attacks [7]. Due
to the controller’s limit capacity, it becomes a bottleneck
[8].
• Data layer. A SDN compatible switch (e.g., OpenFlow
switch) is easy to be compromised [9]. Furthermore, a
SDN switch has to buffer incoming packets until the
controller issues flow rules. However, the switch always
has a limited number of flow tables and buffer size that
data plane cannot handle a saturation attacks [2] or traffic
uncertainty in OpenFlow data plane [10]. These attacks
subsequently lead to DoS attacks that render the data
plane in an unpredictable state.
• Application layer. The application is responsible for
providing a set of services and applications. The deployed
network applications can manipulate the behavior of
the network, and yet they could cause serious security
challenges [11]. Likewise, a large number of third-party
applications could result in serious security vulnerabilities
and challenges because of the lack of a well authentica-
tion for third-party applications[12].
B. Network Calculus
Network calculus is a mathematical study of queues and can
derive lower bounds (i.e., worst-case) of the system, including
backlog, delay and similar performance metrics [13]. Network
calculus particular focuses on quality of service guarantee
analysis. This theory uses the alternate algebras such as the
min-plus and max-plus algebra to transform complex network
systems into analytically tractable systems. To complete these
analysis, incoming traffic and service provides by a system are
all modeled as functions.
Network calculus holds promise as a valuable systematic
methodology for the performance analysis of computer and
communication systems [14]. In this paper, we hence leverage
network calculus to estimate switch buffer size in SDN.
Furthermore, a threshold is set, which is used to trigger PBUF.
For the sake of discussion, we use OVS (Open vSwitch) as
the default SDN switch. To avoid OVS buffer overflow, we
should trigger our approach before the buffer is running out.
Considering that network calculus is applied to find the lower
bound, the estimated value is always larger than the true value.
Therefore, the threshold value can be set as an OVS default
buffer size value (256 packets), that the overflow will not occur
in OVS when the flooding attack is coming.
C. Motivation
Studying on data plane and control plane, we find that
they all have bottlenecks. For example, 5406zl switch has a
limited TCAM size which only instals about 1500 OpenFlow
rules [8]. In addition, some SDN compatible switches can
only generate about 150 packet_in messages per second
(i.e., Pic8 Pronto) [15]. Moreover, Wang [15] found that the
bottleneck is at the control plane rather than at the data plane.
As discussed above, a huge number of table-miss
packets are waiting for processing while the flooding attack
is happening on account of the control and data plane has
a limitation capacity [2] [15]. Nonetheless, OpenFlow switch
cannot always offer sufficient switch buffer to store all of these
table-miss packets. Consequently, it would attract various
security threats, such as buffer overflow, sessions interrupting
and information leaking through side-channel attacks [16].
There are some solutions can handle table-miss pack-
ets when the buffer is full. Generally speaking, these
table-miss packets can be dropped, forwarded to con-
troller by packet_in messages contains whole packet or
directed to a subsequent switch by some methods [17] [18].
However, it may cause some significant issues. Firstly, some
legitimate requests will be interrupted if the packets are
dropped. Secondly, the controller has a limitation capacity to
process these table-miss packets in a short time. Thirdly,
these overflow packets may be directed to a subsequent switch
randomly [18] or by other methods like ECMP (Equal-Cost
Multi-Path) [19] [17], which will cause link congestion or
routing bottlenecks [20].
In this paper, we intend to design an attack driven defense
approach called PBUF, which can be triggered timely and
further prevent buffer overflow. Then, these table-miss
packets will be scheduled to idle switches and wait for pro-
cessing without causing bandwidth congestion. Considering to
prevent the controller overloaded attack, these table-miss
packets will be sent to controller by a limited rate.
D. Research Challenges
To realize PBUF, there are three challenges need to be
resolved:
• Estimating the available buffer of each switch in real time
without bringing performance decreasing.
• A threshold is needed which is used to trigger PBUF and
prevent buffer overflow.
• Efficiently distributing table-miss packets to desti-
nation, without causing new security issues and perfor-
mance decreasing.
To address the first challenge, we sample the incoming pack-
ets to effectively estimate the available size of the switches. For
the second challenge, we can aware before the switch buffer
size is going to be full, since the network calculus is applied
to find the lower bound [21]. To address the third challenge,
regarding the table-miss packets distribution process, we
propose the PBUF algorithm to efficiently forwarding packets
to idle switches without bringing network congestion and the
other networking security issues.
III. RELATED WORK
Some previous works had presented some flooding attacks
and defense methods in SDN. Mahout [22] uses traditional
statistic based aggregation solutions to prevent flooding attacks
in SDN. AVANT-GUARD [3] is presented to defense TCP
SYN flooding attack in SDN, which can reduce the amount
of data-to-control-plane interactions under DoS attacks, and
solve the communication bottleneck between the data plane
and the control plane. However, it only can defense against
TCP SYN flooding attacks. Wang et al. [2] presented a data-
to-control plane DoS attack in SDN and then introduced
FloodGuard, an efficient framework for defensing against
DoS attack by using migration agent and data plane cache.
The migration agent flooding attack and aims to protect
switches and controller when an attack occurs. An extra
cache is designed that stores proactive flow rules and caches
table-miss packets. FloodGuard is an updated version of
AVANT-GUARD, which can prevent SDN from more kinds of
DoS attack. Nevertheless, designing an extra cache for storing
packets is expensive and cannot be generalized to all SDNs
very well. Moreover, FloodGuard is attack driven approach
which is triggered by a threshold value. However, Wang
has not discussed the threshold value exhaustively in their
paper. Instead of implementing an extra cache to store these
table-miss packets, we propose a method that reduces the
burden of a single switch by forwarding packets from the over
loaded switches to idle switches. Moreover, PBUF use network
calculus to estimate the switch buffer size and set a threshold.
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we demonstrate a feasible approach called
PBUF, which offloads some stateful flow processing and con-
trol tasks directly inside the network switches, so as to reduce
the switch-to-controllers signaling overhead and the latency
shortcomings [23]. At first, we will glean the statistics of
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Fig. 2. Workflow of PBUF.
incoming packets. Then, network calculus is used to estimate
the switch buffer. Based on the approximation, we can forward
the packets to a right switch to mitigate switch overloading.
These packets were bounced several times in data plane before
finally processed by controller. The design of PBUF will be
represented in detail as follows.
A. Overview
PBUF consists of two modules: (1) buffer management
module and (2) packet forwarding module. The workflow of
PBUF is shown in figure 2.
The buffer management module contains statistics collection
and buffer sizing analysis. The buffer management module is
used to gather incoming traffic and estimate the buffer size
of switch. At first, the OVS gleans the statistics of incoming
traffic that the used buffer size can be estimated by network
calculus. Since PBUF is attack driven, we set a threshold value
which equals to OVS default buffer size. Thus, PBUF will be
triggered if the threshold value is not less than the OVS total
buffer size. Since the network calculus will estimate a lower
bound, the OVS will be alerted before the buffer overflows. In
the packet forwarding module, the table-miss packets are
forwarded to other switches by solving the optimization prob-
lem, which achieves low overhead and no congestion. Then
these packets will be sent to the controller as packet_in
messages by using a limited rate.
B. Statistics Collection
For the sake of collecting traffic information, we need to
access switches for reading the traffic statistics. OVS supports
three per-flow counters (packets, bytes and flow duration) for
collecting the statistics in switch. In PBUF, packet counter is
used to statistics gathering by default.
In this paper, OVS gathers these incoming packets statistics
and then analyses these statistics. Each OVS monitors its own
status instead of gathering these information by controller.
As a collateral benefit, possible resource depletion (e.g.,
CPU usage), especially of the controller, is minimized during
statistics collection. Furthermore, instead of monitoring each
packet in the network, PBUF samples the incoming traffic for
analyzing. Based on the collected statistics, the lower bound
of the available buffer of each switch is detailed, which is
detailed in next subsection. The available buffer will be used
for designing packet forwarding algorithm.
C. Buffer Sizing analysis
1) Definitions: We suppose that there are K switches in
SDN and with the same buffer size L. Furthermore, the
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Fig. 3. Backlog and delay features based on network calculus.
switch i (1 ≤ i ≤ K) serves ni hosts. Then, we assume
the used buffer size is Busedi and the unused buffer size is
Bunusedi . Furthermore, we assume that all switches have the
same buffer size value. This assumption is relaxed. We make
this assumption only because it would be tidier to describe the
system. Consequently, we have:
B = Busedi +B
unused
i . (1)
In the SDN paradigm, when a packet arrives at an edge
switch, according to the source address or source port or des-
tination address or destination port, the packet will match a re-
lated existing rule in switch’s TCAM and then forwarded it to
the next switch. If there are no rules matched (table-miss),
the packet_in message (including packet header and buffer
ID which are only a little fraction of a packet) will be sent to
controller when the switch’s buffer is sufficient. However, if
the buffer is running out, a packet_in message, containing
an entire packet, is to be sent to controller for processing.
The packets in switch buffer can be modeled as a queue
system, therefore network calculus can be applied to estimate
some related metrics. The packets’ arrival can be denoted as
an arrival process A(t), which denotes the total number of
packet arrivals in time slots 1, 2, ..., t. The cumulative arrival
process A(t) is a non-decreasing, integer valued function on
the non-negative integer Z+ such that A(0) = 0. The number
of packet arrivals at time t is denoted by a(t). Hence, we have
a(t) = A(t)−A(t− 1).
When t ≥ 0, ∃α(·), ∀s ≤ t, A(t) − A(s) ≤ α(t − s).
Therefore, we consider that α(·) is one of arrival curve of A(t).
In other words, the cumulative arrival process A(t) is said
to be (σ, ρ)-upper constrained, which is denoted as A(t) ∼
α(t), where α(t) = ρ(t− s) + σ. We hence call the function
α(t) is an envelope of the arrivals process A(t). As shown in
figure 3, the α(t) can cover the process A(t) and can be called
as an envelope of A(t). Furthermore, the burstiness and the
average sustainable rate of arrivals are represented by σ and
ρ, respectively. Moreover, we can see that the queue system
will be backlogged at t if A(t) > D(t).
2) SDN Switch Model: Our SDN switch model is shown
in figure 4, which is similar to [24]. We assume that the model
consists of cumulative table-miss packets arrival A(t) and
legitimate packets M(t), service curve S(t) and cumulative
packets departure D(t). The S(t) is denoted as the rate of
generating packet_in messages in switch. The M(t) is
S(t)
A(t) D(t)
Used Buﬀer
M(t)
Fig. 4. An analytical model of SDN switch .
the incoming packets from benign hosts, which contains a
little new packets and most matched packets. These matched
packets will be forwarded to related switch directly. Hence, a
little number of packets from M(t) will be buffered in switch.
3) Analysis of the SDN Switch: The table-miss A(t)
should generate packet_in events and send to controller,
which contain only a little fraction of the packet header and
a buffer ID to be used by a controller if the buffer size
is sufficient. The most part of packet still queue in buffer.
The A(t) will be buffered in a queue system waiting for
process. However, the M(t) is supposed to be a constant
value M . Moreover, the most part of M will not be processed
by server, which will be forwarded to destination directly.
Therefore, only m packets should be processed. Given a
system with service curve S(t) and upper constrained arrivals
with envelope α(t), the departure process D(t) can be derived
[21]. We have:
D(t) = sup
τ≥0
{α(t+ τ)− (S(τ)−m)}. (2)
Accordingly, the backlog (used buffer size) of switch i is
defined as [21]:
Busedi = A(t)−D(t). (3)
Moreover, backlog is the vertical distance between the cu-
mulative arrival and departure functions. By insertion of the
definition of service curve and arrival envelope, a worst-case
bound for the maximal backlog Bmax can be derived [21]. We
have:
Bmax ≤ sup
τ≥0
{α(τ)− S((τ)−m)} = α S(0)−m. (4)
where  is referred to as the min-plus de-convolution.
We hence can estimate the worst-case backlog bound in
a queue, which is caused by incoming packets. If the Bmax
reaches to the threshold B, we suppose that the buffer overflow
will occur. Thereafter, the packets must be forwarded to other
switches. The reason we set B as the threshold is that the
Bmax is an estimation of the worst-case which is larger than
the real value.
D. Packet Forwarding
We propose a mitigate defense approach, under which, a
switch treats each other switch as a node. When a node is
going to run out of its own buffer, the other nodes will support
their own idle buffer for buffer table-miss packets, thus
to mitigate the flooding attacks. Moreover, these packets will
be guided to other idle nodes by packet forwarding module.
Consequently, these packets will be distributed to the entire
network rather than being aggregated at a switch. In this way,
the idle resources in network can be used to mitigate attacks.
Accordingly, a new problem is raised: how to distribute
these packets to the other idle nodes efficiently. PBUF follows
the following principles: 1) the node’s buffer is not full, 2) the
node has a larger buffer size than the other, 3) the idle node
is nearest to the to-be-overloaded switch, 4) and the node
connects to more switches than the other. Furthermore, the
controller has the information of the topology, such as the
paths’ bandwidth. Thus, the attack effects will be limited to
minimal by PBUF, which aggregates the idle resource of the
entire network for defending against flooding attack. At the
first and second principles, we use network calculus to estimate
the buffer size and then encapsulate the estimated buffer size
and rate information in LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol)
packets, which is used to discover the interconnected links
between the OVS in SDN. LLDP packets are sent regularly
via each port of a switch and are addressed to a bridge-filtered
multicast address, and are therefore not forwarded by switches,
but only sent across a single hop. For the third principle, each
node has the knowledge of neighbor nodes. For the fourth
principle, the controller has the knowledge of topology that
we can pre-store this topology information in OVS on account
of the topology is unchangeable.
The number of flooding packets will be large in a short
time that the distributing packets method focuses on speed
rather than effectively. Correspondingly, we present a PBUF
algorithm to solve this problem is a promising candidate as
it can favor large number packets, which rapidly chooses an
idle node to buffer these table-miss packets at each stage
and brings little overhead. Although the ECMP or random
method can also distribute these packets to entire network
quickly, it raises some issues, such as bandwidth congestion
and network loop. However, the calculated forwarding paths of
PBUF update frequently and can avoid link congestion, which
is updated according to the real time network state.
PBUF algorithm is “greedy”: we leverage this algorithm
to find a path efficiently that does not contain the to-be-
overloaded nodes and raise the other networking security is-
sue. Furthermore, based on this algorithm, each packet selects
approximate well node according to the neighbor nodes′ states
which update all the time. Therefore, all of the incoming
packets will be distributed to idle nodes to avoid bandwidth
congestion. The main iterative steps of greedy algorithm are
shown in algorithm 1. The algorithm 1 decides the input pkt
destination according to nodes and path resource level. If the
incoming pkt has only one available nodes to be forwarded,
which happens to be the previous nodes, this pkt would be
sent to controller. Otherwise, the incoming pkt will be sent to
dstNode(Lines:2-7). Then, a node will be chosen, which has a
lower buffer size(Lines:9-24). To avoid network loop, the node
where the pkt coming from would be exclude (Lines:10-11).
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and perfor-
mance of PBUF. Firstly, we study the effectiveness of the
buffer overflow attacks. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness
of our proposed strategy with simulations. To investigate the
Algorithm 1 PBUF
Require: Current node: curtNode, input packet: pkt
Ensure: Destination node: dstNode
1: dstNode = null
2: if curtNode.nearByNodesNum == 1 then
3: if pkt received from curtNode.nearByNodes.first then
4: send to controller
5: else
6: dstNode = curtNode.nearByNodes.first
7: end if
8: else
9: for node in curtNode.nearByNodes do
10: if pkt received from node then
11: continue
12: else if dstNode == null then
13: dstNode = node
14: continue
15: end if
16: if node.bufferNum < dstNode.bufferNum then
17: dstNode = node
18: else if node.bufferNum == dstNode.bufferNum then
19: if node.nearByNodesNum > dstNode.nearByNodesNum
then
20: dstNode = node
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
24: dstNode.bufferNum = dstNode.bufferNum + 1
25: end if
overheads of the proposed strategy, we evaluate the perfor-
mance on the controller.
A. Experiment Setup
Topology: We use Mininet to emulate the OpenFlow-
enabled network data plane and implement the buffer man-
agement module and packet forwarding module in OVS. For
sake of simulating PBUF, we generate a small topology (m
Core switches, n Agg switches, k ToR switches, and each ToR
switch has 2 hosts). For example, a topology is shown in figure
5 where m = 2, n = 3, k = 6. OpenDaylight is used as the
controller. Moreover, an application running on OpenDaylight
is used to guide the incoming packets to destination by
matching source and destination address. Besides, the features
of OVS and OpenFlow is 2.6.0 and 1.5.0, respectively.
Adversary model: For simulating flooding attack fea-
ture well, we implement the packet-level simulations. There
are some legitimated packets from benign hosts in SDN,
which contain table-match and table-miss packets.
For modeling the process packets more intuitively, we make
the assumption that the legitimated packets number is a
constant value in each time slot. Furthermore, the number
of table-match packets are much larger than the number
of table-miss packets in incoming legitimated packets.
We use Hping3 to generate and simulate TCP-based flooding
attacks that these flooding packets’ source and destination are
forged and random. Accordingly, each of incoming packet is
a new packet for OVS that the OVS should generate a new
packet_in message for each new packet. By default, the
buffer size of OVS are 256 packets. Further, one benign host
connects to the ingress OVS. The benign host will generate
Core m=2
Agg n=3
ToR k=6
Fig. 5. Data plane topology.
legitimate flows with a low rate, such as 30pps (packets per
second).
B. Flooding attack effectiveness
To present the effectiveness of the buffer overflow attacks
in SDNs, we simulate an attack process with an average attack
rate and record the ingress OVS buffer size under the flooding
attack. The used buffer size Busedingress of ingress OVS is used as
the metric which is represented flooding attack effectiveness.
To represent the effectiveness of flooding attack, the first
ingress OVS’s buffer size is recorded based on OpenFlow
scheme in a short period. Besides, we set the attack average
rate as 500pps and generate a simple topology, m = 10,
n = 11 and k = 22. Furthermore, we sample 10 packets
in 100 packets.
The variation of OVS buffer size under the flooding attack
based on OpenFlow scheme is shown in figure 6. We can
observe that the buffer size reaches at 256 packets (OVS’s
default total buffer size) at about 0.8s without any defense
approach. However, the duration of flooding attack maybe a
longer time than 0.8s that results in the OVS overflow.
C. Defense effects
To study the defense effects of the buffer overflow attacks
in SDNs, we also simulate an attacking process in SDNs with
an average attack rate. Furthermore, we use the holding time
as a metric to measure the flooding attack effectiveness based
on PBUF and OpenFlow scheme, respectively. The holding
time means that the SDN framework can hold when flooding
attack happen. In other words, the flooding attack happens at
t. The first OVS buffer overflow is at t′ under flooding attack.
the holding time hence can be represented as (t′ − t).
To measure the impact of the switch’s number on defense
effect, we vary m from 2 to 10, n from 3 to 11 and k from 6
to 22. The average attack rate is set as 500pps.
The defense effectiveness under 500pps is shown in figure
7. Comparing to the two holding times, we can observe
that PBUF can help with mitigating flooding attack. In this
experiment, we keep sending flooding packets until one of
OVSs buffer is overflowed. As we can observe from figure
7, the holding time in each topology without any defense
methods are almost same. Moreover, these holding times are
all short. In other words, the SDN framework without any
defense methods suffering from the flooding attack can be
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compromised in short time regardless of the topology. When
we implement PBUF in SDN framework, we can find that
these holding times are increased and the red bars is increasing
as the topology become larger. Because of the number of idle
switches will increase as topology become more larger. Hence,
the idle OVS’s buffer resource will be larger. The simulation
results show that PBUF can mitigate flooding attacks in SDN
with the proper configuration.
D. Defense performance
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the OVS
when PBUF is applied to defend the attack.
In forwarding packet module, we use PBUF to forwarding
packets. However, some other forwarding methods can also
be implemented in forwarding packet module. For example,
ECMP and random method. These two forwarding methods
are represented in algorithm 2 and algorithm 3, respectively.
To measure the performance, ECMP and random method will
be implemented in forwarding packet module as alternative
methods. The bandwidth usage and buffer overflow are all used
as metrics to measure the performance of packet forwarding.
Furthermore, we suppose that the overflow probability means:
numberoverflow/numberall. numberall means the number of
all incoming packets; numberoverflow means the number of
entire packet which overflow from the switch and the should
be forwarded to controller for processing. Moreover, we use
an open source tool iperf to measure the bandwidth.
We vary average attack rate from 0pps to 500pps. Further-
more, a topology (m = 10, n = 11 and k = 22) is generated.
And the duration of flooding attack is 20s.
Defense performance under different attack rates are shown
in figure 8. As shown in figure 8(a), we observe that OpenFlow
Algorithm 2 ECMP
Require: input packet
Ensure: Destination node
1: dstNode = null
2: if currnetNode.bufferNum <= threshold then
3: send to controller
4: else
5: dstNode = Hash(packet) {flow hashing}
6: end if
Algorithm 3 Random Method
Require: input packet
Ensure: Destination node
1: dstNode = null
2: if currnetNode.bufferNum <= threshold then
3: send to controller
4: else
5: dstNode = Random(packet)
6: end if
scheme suffer from the overflow as the attacking flow rate
increases. The switch’s buffer overflow are all 0 when there is
no attack. However, under attack, the OpenFlow scheme will
result in high overflow probability. Particularly, the overflow
probability is larger than 0.5 when the attack rate exceeding
220pps, and could be as high as 0.8 when the attack rate is
500pps. Meantime,we find that the other forwarding packet
methods will not bring OVS buffer overflow. We can observe
that the other three schemes are identical, which means there
are no overflow happening in OVS. For the ECMP method,
it statically stripes flows across available paths using flow
hashing. Hence, the table-miss packets will be forwarded
instead of asking for controller. Considering the random
method, it forwards these table-miss packets randomly
instead of asking for controller that there is no overflow in
switch. For our heuristic algorithm implemented in packet
forwarding module, it forward these table-miss packets
to next idle switch quickly. Hence, our heuristic algorithm
also can reach a forwarding efficiency level as the ECMP and
random method. Furthermore, PBUF also do not brings switch
buffer overflow. Therefore, the threshold works in time.
These forwarding packet methods all would affect the
bandwidth, such as link congestion, which are presented in
figure 8(b). We note that the OpenFlow bandwidth curve
decreases quickly as the flooding attack rate increases and it
will run out when the attack rate reach at 500pps. The random
method also causes bandwidth congestion. Unlike OpenFlow
method, ECMP and random methods consume about half of
bandwidth. Although ECMP forwards table-miss packets
quickly, it static maps of flows to paths does not account for
either current network state, with bringing about bandwidth
congestion issue. Also like ECMP, the random method does
not consider the current network state and chooses the paths
randomly. It hence brings about a bandwidth congestion issue.
PBUF also brings a congestion issue, whereas it is less than
the ECMP and random methods. A heuristic algorithm is
implemented in packet forwarding module, which not only
concerns path’s bandwidth but also concern the other issues.
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Fig. 8. Defense Performance Under Different Attack Rates.
E. Overhead
This subsection mainly concerns on CPU usage of controller
and processing time of all incoming packets. With respect
to controller CPU usage, when under flooding attack, there
will be much more random source address packets arriv-
ing at ingress switch. Therefore, the controller needs more
CPU resource to process these flooding packets. In regard to
the processing time, it represents flooding packets in from
ingress OVS to destination is measured. Obviously, these
table-miss packets should take some time and wait in the
buffer for processing.
To measure the CPU usage, we generate a topology (m =
10, n = 11 and k = 22) and flooding attacks with average
80pps and 300pps, respectively. Besides, the duration of flood-
ing attack are all set as 20s.
From figure 9(a), firstly, we can find that, under a low
average rate 80pps, the flooding attack will all bring high
usages of controllers’ CPU at about 20s. A high CPU usage
means that the application in controller should process the
number of remaining packets is large. Since the controller
should process these packet_in messages and instal new
rules on OVSs by packet_out messages at the same time.
As a result of which, the CPU usage will decrease since all
new rules has been installed on OVSs. We can observe that
the two curves are almost similar, which means PBUF is not
triggered when the attack rate is 80pps.
We also observe the variation of CPU usage under an
average 300pps flooding attack in figure 9(b). At first, the
two CPU usages increase quickly and reaches to the peaks
in seconds. Then the two curves decrease to 0 at different
times. Moreover, we find that the peak of OpenFlow scheme
is higher than PBUF scheme. Besides, as PBUF limits the
rate of packet_in messages to controller, the peak values
of CPU usage are different.
From Table I, we can find that the average processing
times are almost identical under 80pps. Under the 300pps, the
OpenFlow scheme and PBUF scheme takes about 36.83s and
38.95s to process these incoming packets, respectively. Com-
paring to OpenFlow scheme, PBUF takes more time (about
2s) to process these incoming packets. Rather than the OVS
buffer overflow, the overhead is acceptable. Therefore, PBUF
mitigates flooding attacks with an acceptable low overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we point out that, because of the limitation
of buffer resource in OpenFlow-enabled switches, SDNs are
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Fig. 9. CPU Usage Under 80pps and 300pps Rate
TABLE I
THE AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME UNDER 80PPS AND 300PPS
Average Processing Time Under 80pps Under 300pps
OpenFlow 26.39s 36.83s
PBUF 26.51s 38.95s
vulnerable to the flooding attack, which aims to SDN devices.
Hence, we propose a defense approach which uses idle OVS
resource in the whole SDN framework to mitigate flooding
attack. We attempt to dynamically find idle resources when the
local resources are used up, to improve the resistance of the
network. Hence, we implement buffer management and packet
forwarding modules in OVS, respectively. The experiments
confirm that we can remarkably improve the SDNs capacity
of defending against the flooding attack. Basing on these
experiment results, we also provide theoretical guidance on
how to estimate OVS buffer size against buffer overflow. In
the future, we expect to find a method to differentiate the
attacking flows from legitimate ones in real time, so that we
can drop the attacking traffic before they enter further in the
network, thus to solve the problem fundamentally.
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